Appendix J – NIH Oversight of Research Involving Recombinant Biosafety Issues

Appendix J:   NIH Oversight of Research Involving Recombinant Biosafety Issues

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5 Comments

  1. Lynn Klotz's Gravatar Lynn Klotz
    May 13, 2016    

    I propose a revision to the BMBL that would allow the BMBL to deal with the new realities of dangerous research, in particular the creation of and research with live dangerous potential pandemic pathogens.”
    The proposal is too long for this Comment box, so I refer you to the following URL (http://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Comment-on-NIH-Oversight-of-Research-1.pdf) to read the proposal. The two key elements of the proposal are:
    (1) A mechanism for making decisions about research on laboratory-created potential pandemic pathogens or research. Three committees would be involved: Existing Institutional Biosafety Committee and NIH reviews, supplemented by a non-government Committee of Experts review.
    (2) If one or more of the committees recommends banning the particular research in the U.S., a final decision would be made by an Executive-branch Committee that could include members from the National Security Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of State, and perhaps others. This committee composition would help ensure that dual-use security concerns, biosafety risk to the community, and international ramifications are addressed

  2. Lynn Klotz's Gravatar Lynn Klotz
    May 12, 2016    

    I left a comment the other day, and haven’t heard yet about it.

    Lynn Klotz

  3. Anonymous's Gravatar Anonymous
    May 11, 2016    

    The RAC and OBA should be compelled to update and simplify the NIH guidelines and to routinely update decisions made at RAC meetings. Many decisions seem to only be visible in meeting minutes and are not easily accessible.

  4. Lynn C. Klotz's Gravatar Lynn C. Klotz
    May 9, 2016    

    I propose a revision to the BMBL that would allow the BMBL to deal with the new realities of dangerous research, in particular the creation of and research with live dangerous potential pandemic pathogens.”
    The proposal is too long for this Comment box, so I refer you to the following URL (http://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Comment-on-NIH-Oversight-of-Research.pdf) to read the proposal. The two key elements of the proposal are:
    (1) A mechanism for making decisions about research on laboratory-created potential pandemic pathogens or research. Three committees would be involved: Existing Institutional Biosafety Committee and NIH reviews, supplemented by a non-government Committee of Experts review.
    (2) If one or more of the committees recommends banning the particular research in the U.S., a final decision would be made by an Executive-branch Committee that could include members from the National Security Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of State, and perhaps others. This committee composition would help ensure that dual-use security concerns, biosafety risk to the community, and international ramifications are addressed
    Lynn Klotz, PhD
    Senior Science Fellow
    Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation
    E-mail: lynnklotz@live.com

  5. CSHEMA Biosafety Community of Practice's Gravatar CSHEMA Biosafety Community of Practice
    May 9, 2016    

    General: Need to include Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules.
    Page 394: Need to include an updated definition.
    Page 394: In section III, not all experiments involving recombinant/synthetic nucleic acid molecules require IBC approval. Section III-F experiments are exempt from IBC review and approval.